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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kyle Andersen appeals from his judgment of conviction for one count of possession of a
controlled substance and one count of concealment of evidence following a jury trial. The
district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial after one potential juror tainted the
panel by disclosing he was a recovering methamphetamine addict and then stating that
Mr. Andersen “looks like he does meth.” Mr. Andersen’s constitutional right to a fair, impartial
jury was violated by the prospective juror’s statement, which tainted the entire panel. As such,
the district court should have granted his motion for a mistrial. Additionally, the district court
erred when it denied Mr. Andersen’s motion for judgment of acquittal because he was subjected
to double jeopardy when he was convicted and punished for both possession of a controlled
substance and concealment of evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on December 26, 2016, officers observed a car in an alley
that was driving without its headlights on. (R., p.10; Tr., p.106, L.3 – p.107, L.17.) One of the
officers testified that, upon seeing the car, he backed up his patrol vehicle, turned towards the
car, and the car then pulled into an adjacent parking lot and stopped. (Tr., p.107, L.20 – p.108,
L.19.) The officer said that, as he was getting out of his vehicle, he saw a man exit the driver’s
side door of the car and go to the passenger’s side, and then his partner told him that he saw the
man throw something. (Tr., p.110, Ls.6-21.) The man was later identified as Mr. Andersen, and
when officers searched the area where the item was thrown, a plastic box with a “white
crystalline substance” in it was discovered. (Tr., p.113, L.4 – p.119, L.25, p.159, L.5 – p.161,
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L.4.) The results of subsequent testing revealed that the substance was methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.123, Ls.10-14, p.178, Ls.2-6.)
Subsequently, Mr. Andersen was charged with one felony count of possession of a
controlled substance, one felony count of concealment of evidence, one misdemeanor count of
possession of a controlled substance, and one misdemeanor count of invalid driver’s license.
(R., pp.149-50.) He pled not guilty and elected to proceed to trial. (R. p.60.) During voir dire,
the district court asked the panel whether any of them had already formed an opinion as to
whether Mr. Andersen was guilty, and one of the prospective jurors answered, “Yes.” (Tr., p.42,
Ls.8-14.) When the court asked why, the juror said, “I’m a recovering meth addict of twenty
years ago, and in my opinion by the looks of him, looks like he does meth.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.1519.) Mr. Andersen’s counsel promptly asked the district court to strike the jury panel based on
the prospective juror’s statement, but the district court said, “We’ll take it up later.” (Tr., p.43,
Ls.10-15.)
Ultimately, while the court excused the person who commented on Mr. Andersen’s
appearance, it declined to strike the panel and never questioned the remaining jurors about
whether they could remain impartial in light of the potential juror’s comment. Instead, the
district court continued voir dire and then asked Mr. Andersen’s counsel if he would pass the
panel for cause. (Tr., p.43, L.15 – p.75, L.18.) When counsel said “No, Your Honor,” the
district court asked, “When might that occur?” (Tr., p.75, Ls.19-20.) Counsel reminded the
district court about his motion to strike the panel, but the district court said, “Passing the panel
for cause is different than a motion to disqualify the panel.” (Tr., p.75, Ls.21-25.) Counsel
responded, “If your honor believes the two questions are different, other than that, I would pass
for cause but still ask to take up the additional issue.” (Tr., p.76, Ls.3-6.) The court then went
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on to swear in the jurors who had heard the prospective juror’s statement and to read the initial
instructions. (Tr., p.82, L.21 – p.92, L.20.)
At that point, out of the presence of the jury, Mr. Andersen’s counsel reasserted his
motion based on the prejudicial meth statement. (Tr., p.93, Ls.11-23.) He said, “We’d ask the
Court to find that the jury panel was tainted by the comments of . . . Juror No. 1 . . . stating that
he had personal knowledge of methamphetamine use and that the defendant . . . was a
methamphetamine user based on his look.” (Tr., p.93, Ls.11-18.) He went on to say, “I think
that would taint the jury panel . . . and we’d ask the Court to I guess declare a mistrial at this
point.

We’d need a new jury panel and have one who hasn’t heard the accusation that the

defendant is a methamphetamine user.” (Tr., p.93, Ls.18-23.) The district court denied the
motion, instead offering to give a curative instruction.

(Tr., p.94, L.16 – p.95, L.9.)

Mr. Andersen’s counsel argued that a curative instruction would be insufficient given the highly
prejudicial comment, stating, “We don’t believe any instruction could cure that.” (Tr., p.95,
Ls.10-11.)
The district court then said, “[I]f evidence that shouldn’t have come in can be corrected
with a jury instruction, then a comment that is not evidence certainly can be cured with an
instruction, and a mistrial is not warranted.” (Tr., p.95, Ls.20-24.) It said it would give an
instruction to the jurors when they returned, and “[t]hat way . . . the jury’s been given that
instruction in as close proximity in time as we could realistically do that here today.” (Tr., p.96,
Ls.11-16.) Once the jury had returned, the district court gave the following instruction: “You
are instructed that anything said by any person during voir dire is not evidence. Anything said
by any person during jury selection must not enter into your decision-making process in any
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way, and that concludes the opening instructions.” (Tr., p.97, Ls.2-7.) The parties then made
their opening statements.
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Andersen guilty of possession of methamphetamine,
concealment of evidence, and invalid driver’s license.

(Tr., p.236, L.24 - p.237, L.10.)

Subsequently, defense counsel filed a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 29 in which he argued that Mr. Andersen’s right to be free from double jeopardy
was violated when he was convicted for both possession of a controlled substance and
concealment of evidence. (R., pp.200-06.) Before deciding that motion, the district court
imposed two concurrent sentences of four years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.208-09; Tr., p.258, Ls.1-13.)
After the sentencing hearing, the district court held a hearing on the motion for judgment
of acquittal. There, it stated, “I am going to deny the motion. I don’t think that a Rule 29 is . . .
the mechanism for a Constitutional challenge which is really the focus of the defendant’s
motion.” (Tr., p.265, Ls.19-23.) It went on to say, “Even if it were the right vehicle, I don’t find
that concealment and possession have the same facts, the same elements. It wouldn’t meet a
double jeopardy challenge even if Rule 29 was the proper vehicle.” (Tr., p.265, L.23 – p.266,
L.1.)

Mr. Andersen filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of

conviction and its order denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., pp.223-26.)
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ISSUES
I.

Was Mr. Andersen’s constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury violated when
the district court denied his motion for a mistrial after a prospective juror told the entire
jury panel that Mr. Andersen looked like he used methamphetamine?

II.

Did Mr. Andersen’s convictions and punishments for possession of a controlled
substance and concealment of evidence violate his right to be free from double jeopardy?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Mr. Andersen’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By An Impartial Jury Was Violated When
The District Court Denied His Motion For A Mistrial After A Prospective Juror Told The Entire
Jury Panel That Mr. Andersen Looked Like He Used Methamphetamine

A. Introduction
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause, guarantee criminal defendants the right to a trial by an unbiased jury. Here,
Mr. Andersen’s right to an unbiased jury was violated after the entire jury panel learned from a
prospective juror that he “looks like he does meth.” Thus, the district court erred when it denied
his motion for a mistrial based on the prospective juror’s inherently prejudicial statement.

B.

Standard Of Review
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse
of discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion.

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 68 (2011) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).

C.

This Issue Was Preserved For Appeal
When a defendant renews a jury challenge prior to passing the jury, his motion for

mistrial based on a prospective juror’s statement is preserved for appeal.

State v. Pratt, 160

Idaho 248, 250–51 (2016). Here, defense counsel’s motion to strike the jury panel, his initial
refusal to pass the panel for cause, and his response to the district court when it told him that
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“[p]assing the panel for cause is different than a motion to disqualify the panel,” preserved this
issue for appeal. At that point, Mr. Andersen’s counsel said, “[I]f your honor believes the two
questions are different, other than that, I would pass the panel for cause but still ask to take up
the additional issue.” (Tr., p.76, Ls.3-6.) Thus, counsel first raised the issue by moving to strike
the panel based on the prospective juror’s statement. (Tr., p.43, Ls.10-14.) Then, after the
district court’s statement that, “passing the panel for cause is different than a motion to disqualify
the panel,”1 counsel did not give an unqualified pass for cause. Instead, he maintained his
objection to the jury panel and later renewed his motion for a mistrial due to the prospective
juror’s statement. (Tr., p.93, Ls.11-23.) Therefore, this issue was preserved for appeal.

D.

The Prospective Juror’s Statement That Mr. Andersen “Looks Like He Does Meth”
Tainted The Entire Jury Panel
“By the looks of him, looks like he does meth.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.17-19.) Every member of

Mr. Andersen’s jury heard this statement from a potential juror and admitted former
methamphetamine addict before Mr. Andersen’s trial for possession of methamphetamine had
even started. Thus, before any evidence was presented, they all had a clear picture in their minds
about Mr. Andersen that related directly to the crime he was charged with and that colored their
view of the evidence against him from that point forward because the prospective juror’s
conclusion concerned Mr. Andersen’s appearance and was made by someone with knowledge
and experience in the matter.
As such, the district court should have granted Mr. Andersen’s motion for a mistrial. “A
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is

1

The district court did not explain its reasoning.
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prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”

I.C.R. 29.1(a).

Mr. Andersen was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. “A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69 (citing U.S. CONST.
amends. V, VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, §§ 7, 13).
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually
represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly
carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.
Id. (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (alteration in original)).
In this case, the prospective juror’s statement tainted the entire jury panel because he not
only gave his opinion that Mr. Andersen was guilty, he provided specifics as to why: he
concluded that Mr. Andersen looked like he used methamphetamine and supported that opinion
with a fact that proved he had experience to support his belief and was essentially an expert on
the matter as a “recovering meth addict of twenty years ago . . . .” (Tr., p.42, Ls.17-18.)
Moreover, this conclusion about Mr. Andersen, and its inferences, was inherently prejudicial
because it spoke directly to the crime Mr. Andersen was charged with. This prospective juror’s
conclusion, bolstered by his unique expertise, on a matter at issue in the trial, contrasts sharply
with the generic juror opinions found in Ellington and in fact is precisely the sort of specific
statement contemplated by Ellington’s analysis.
In Ellington, during voir dire, three prospective jurors expressed their beliefs that
Mr. Ellington was guilty in the presence of the entire panel. Id. One of the prospective jurors
said he thought Mr. Ellington was guilty because he read about the case in the papers. Id. at 68.
Another juror said she thought he was guilty because she “had a conversation with a member of
the [victim’s] family the day after the incident . . . .” Id. at 68-69. Finally, one prospective juror
said he could not give Mr. Ellington a fair trial because he had formed an opinion from the news
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on television and in the papers. Id. at 69. When addressing the prejudicial effect of the
statements made by the prospective jurors, the Court noted that none of the jurors who made the
comments ultimately sat on the jury and stated, “At worst, the jurors who actually deliberated
received a second-hand opinion from those three prospective jurors that Mr. Ellington was
guilty. They did not receive any specific facts as to why, other than that the prospective jurors
read about it in the paper and in one instance interacted with a member of the [victim’s] family.”
Id. Thus, a statement that does provide specific facts as to why the juror formed the opinion does
have a prejudicial effect.
Here, the prospective juror’s statement was also prejudicial because it concerned
Mr. Andersen’s appearance. This is different than the statements from prospective jurors in
Ellington. None of those statements spoke directly to the crime that Mr. Ellington was charged
with like the statement in this case, and none of them focused on Mr. Ellington’s appearance.
Here, the prospective juror told the jury that Mr. Andersen looked like he committed the crime he
was charged with. Thus, unlike Ellington, and cases where a comment was made about a
defendant’s history of incarceration — see e.g. State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2004)
— this statement was more prejudicial because it specifically addressed the charge of possession
of methamphetamine. Further, the prospective juror set himself up as someone with unique,
expert knowledge on the significance of Mr. Andersen’s appearance to the specific issues before
the jury.
Because the prospective juror’s conclusion was specific to the charge, and particularly
because it concerned Mr. Andersen’s appearance, it also had a continuing impact on the trial for
the simple reason that Mr. Andersen was present throughout his trial. Thus, the statement’s
continuing impact was inescapable; every time the jurors looked at Mr. Andersen, they saw
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someone who, according to a former methamphetamine addict, looked like he used
methamphetamine and therefore would probably have possessed methamphetamine.
Finally, the district court’s attempt to cure the prejudice with an instruction came too late
for the jurors to connect it with the prospective juror’s statement. “Where improper testimony is
inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard
such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely.”
Hill, 140 Idaho at 631. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In this case, the district court did not promptly instruct the jury.

Indeed, after the

prospective juror made the statement, voir dire continued, and the district court then went on to
the jury the initial instructions. (Tr., p.42, L.17 – p.93, L.6.) Only then did it give its additional
instruction about statements made in voir dire. (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-7.) Apparently realizing that this
was a problem, the district court said the instruction was given “in as close proximity to in time
as we could realistically do that here today.” 2 (Tr., p.96, Ls.11-16.) As Ellington and Hill
illustrate, this is not true; the instruction could have, and should have, been given immediately
after the statement in order for the presumption in Hill to apply. Indeed, the Court in Ellington
relied on the fact that the district court gave curative instructions “[i]mmediately following” the
comments and also instructed the jury, at the end of voir dire, that they should decide the case
based only on the evidence presented. 151 Idaho at 68-69. Similarly, in State v. Kilby, 130
Idaho 747, 751 (Ct. App. 1997), the court relied on the fact that, immediately after a prejudicial

2

The district court took up the issue again later and discussed relevant precedent. (3/20/17
Tr., p.165, L.22 – p.168, L.18.) In sum, it held that the prospective juror’s statement was an
opinion. It stated, “I suppose you could argue that it was an expert opinion, but it’s still an
opinion, and not a statement of fact.” (3/20/17 Tr., p.96, Ls.8-10.)
10

comment was made during voir dire, the district court “dismissed the potential juror and
cautioned the remaining jurors to disregard the dismissed juror’s comment.”
Here, the instruction came so long after the statement was made that the prejudice was
already established, and the jury almost certainly did not know that the court was referring to the
statement when it read its instruction. As such, the presumption mentioned in Hill should not
apply here, and when viewed in the context of the entire trial, the district court’s denial of
Mr. Andersen’s motion for a mistrial constitutes reversible error.

II.
Mr. Andersen’s Convictions And Punishments For Possession Of A Controlled Substance And
Concealment Of Evidence Violated His Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy

A.

Introduction
Mr. Andersen’s right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was

convicted and punished for the offense of concealment of evidence (methamphetamine), as well
as the included offense of possession of methamphetamine.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because double jeopardy claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, they present questions of
law subject to free review. State v. Byington, 139 Idaho 516, 518 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Mr. Andersen’s Constitutional Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy Was Violated
Because Two Convictions And Punishments Were Imposed For Two Offenses, One Of
Which Was An Included Offense Of The Other
Mr. Andersen was prosecuted and convicted of both concealment of evidence and

possession of a controlled substance in violation of his double jeopardy rights under both the
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Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution; Article I, Section
13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense . . . .”
The Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions provide a
defendant three distinct protections: they protect “against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense.” State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370 (Ct. App.
2011) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624
(Ct. App. 2001)). The third type of protection—against multiple punishments for the same
offense—is at issue here.
In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, which provides a similar guarantee to the double
jeopardy provision of the Idaho Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held that
where a lesser offense requires no proof beyond that required for conviction of the greater
offense, the offenses are “the same offense” within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause
and, cannot be twice prosecuted and twice punished. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69
(1977); see State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980) (“The prohibition against double
jeopardy has been held to mean that defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser
included offense.”).
In Idaho, “[t]here are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to
be a lesser included offense of a charged offense.” State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1996).
Under the “statutory theory” an offense is a lesser-included offense of the greater offense if it is
impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense in the
process. Id. In contrast, under the “pleading theory” an offense is a lesser-included offense “if it
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is alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense.” Id.
Here, possession of a controlled substance is an included offense of concealment of evidence
when that evidence is the controlled substance.

1.

The District Court Erred When It Held That Mr. Andersen’s Motion For
Judgment Of Acquittal Was The Wrong Mechanism For A Constitutional
Challenge And Therefore Refused To Consider Mr. Andersen’s Double Jeopardy
Claim; His Motion Should Have Been Treated According To Its Substance Not Its
Form

The district court refused to consider Mr. Andersen’s double jeopardy claim because it
held that his motion for judgment of acquittal was not the right “mechanism” or “vehicle” for
such a constitutional challenge.

(Tr., p.265, Ls.19-23.)

While it is true that motions for

judgment of acquittal are typically used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, see State v.
Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 580 (Ct. App. 1987), it is also true that courts will not “exalt form over
substance.” In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279 (2005) (citation omitted). Here, in substance,
Mr. Andersen’s motion was an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion alleging an illegal sentence,
and the district court should have construed it as such. In State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841
(2013), the Idaho Supreme Court held that double jeopardy claims can be made in a motion
challenging a sentence as illegal because “any double jeopardy violation would be apparent from
the face of the record.” Further, “Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect to postjudgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over form, and a
mislabeled pleading will be treated according to its substance.” Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho
186, 190 (Ct. App. 2008).
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2.

Even If This Court Finds That Mr. Andersen’s Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal
Was Not The Proper Vehicle For Raising A Double Jeopardy Claim, Fundamental
Error Would Apply Here

The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to
error.

See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).

Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must

demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) there
was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not contained in the
appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that there is
a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226.
Mr. Andersen meets all the prongs of this test.
First, Mr. Andersen is challenging the multiple convictions he suffered for the same
offense, which is a violation of his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Idaho
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, Mr. Andersen
is challenging a violation of his constitutional rights. And he clearly did not waive those rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record.

The Second Amended

Information and the jury instructions are in the record (R., pp.149-50, 164-98.), so there is no
need for additional information outside the record.
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. It was apparent from the relevant pleadings and statutes that the jury convicted for
both the concealment of evidence offense and the included offense of possession of a controlled
substance. Thus, Mr. Andersen’s substantial rights were affected as he now suffers from two
convictions (is twice punished) for the same offense, a violation of his Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy.
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3.

Mr. Andersen’s Prosecutions And Convictions Violated Mr. Andersen’s Right To
Be Free From Double Jeopardy Under The Blockburger Statutory Test

Despite holding that Mr. Andersen’s motion for judgment of acquittal was not the proper
motion for a constitutional challenge, the district court nevertheless briefly addressed the merits
of the motion. It stated, “Even if it were the right vehicle, I don’t find that concealment and
possession have the same facts, the same elements.

It wouldn’t meet a double jeopardy

challenge even if Rule 29 was the proper vehicle.” (Tr., p.265, L.23 – p.266, L.1.) Thus, it
appears the district court briefly considered Mr. Andersen’s claim under the statutory theory used
by the United States Supreme Court to interpret the Fifth Amendment See Curtis, 130 Idaho at
524; Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69.
The United States Supreme Court applies a statutory theory to determine whether a
defendant’s prosecution or conviction and punishment violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The test
under Blockburger provides that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there have been two
offenses or only one for double jeopardy purposes is whether each statutory provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Id. at 304. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that the Blockburger test is appropriate to determine whether an offense is a lesser included
offense under the statutory theory in analyzing whether there has been a double jeopardy
violation under the United States Constitution. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527 (2011).
Under the Blockburger test, the question is whether each statutory provision requires
proof of a fact [element] not required by the other statute. 284 U.S. at 304. The United States
Supreme Court has clarified that, “[i]t has long been understood that separate statutory crimes
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need not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual proof in order to be the same
within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.” Brown, 432 U.S. at 164.
The two statutes at issue in this case are I.C. § 18-2603 (concealment of evidence) and
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (possession of a controlled substance).

(R., p.149.)

The relevant

concealment definition states:
Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in
writing, or other object, matter or thing, is about to be produced, used or
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation
whatever, authorized by law, willfully destroys, alters or conceals the same,
with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, used or discovered, is
guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the trial, proceeding, inquiry or investigation
is criminal in nature and involves a felony offense, in which case said person
is guilty of a felony and subject to a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars
($10,000) and a maximum sentence of five (5) years in prison.
I.C. § 18-2603. The possession of a controlled substance statute provides:
(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or
order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice,
or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a
controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a
controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a felony . . . .
I.C. § 3732(c)(1).
Thus the relevant elements of concealment of evidence in this case are that the defendant
willfully concealed methamphetamine, and knew that the methamphetamine was about to be
used or discovered in an investigation authorized by law, and the investigation was criminal in
nature and involved a felony offense. I.C. § 18-2603(c)(1); R., pp.183-84.
The relevant elements for possession of a controlled substance are that the defendant
possessed any amount of methamphetamine, and either knew it was methamphetamine or
believed it was a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1); I.C.J.I. 403; R. pp.179-82.

16

Therefore, both statutes require that the defendant possess methamphetamine. Indeed, it
would be impossible to conceal methamphetamine without first possessing it. Possession of a
controlled substance does not require proof of an element not present in the charge of
concealment of evidence. As such, possession of a controlled substance is an included offense of
concealment of evidence under the Blockburger test. As Mr. Andersen was charged with and
found guilty of both possession of a controlled substance and concealment of evidence, the
punishment for both offenses violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.

4.

Mr. Andersen’s Prosecutions And Convictions Violated Mr. Andersen’s Right To
Be Free From Double Jeopardy Under The Pleading Test

“The double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution states: ‘No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.’” State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, 87 (2016) (quoting
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13). Under Idaho’s double jeopardy clause, “a defendant may not be
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense.” Sepulveda, 161 Idaho at 87 (quoting
State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013)). Punishment for both the greater offense and the
lesser included offense violates the Idaho Constitution. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658
(Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 434–35 (1980)).
Idaho courts use the pleading theory “to determine whether one offense is a lesserincluded offense of the other.” Id. at 658 (citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434–35). “This theory
holds ‘that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the information [or indictment] as a
means or element of the commission of the higher offense.’” State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 529
(2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211 (1986)). “Under this
pleading theory, a court must consider whether the terms of the charging document allege that
both offenses arose from the same factual circumstances such that one offense was the means by
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which the other was committed.” Moad, 156 Idaho at 658 (citing Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435;
McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841; State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 115 (1979); State v. Anderson,
82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960)). “An ‘included offense’ is one which is necessarily committed in the
commission of another offense; or one, the essential elements of which are charged in the
information as the manner or means by which the offense was committed.” Thompson, 101 Idaho
at 434 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)).
Here, Mr. Andersen was charged with two offenses arising from the same factual
circumstances. The Information charged:
COUNT I
That the defendant, KYLE DAVID ANDERSEN, on or about or between 26th
day of December 2016 in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did unlawfully
possess a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled
substance.
COUNT II
That the defendant, KYLE DAVID ANDERSEN, on or about the 26th day of
December, 2016, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, knowing that an
object or thing, to wit; methamphetamine, was about to be used or discovered in a
felony proceeding or investigation, did conceal said methamphetamine with the
intent thereby to prevent it from being so used or discovered.
(R., pp.81-83.) Analyzing these two charges, Mr. Andersen’s possession of methamphetamine
was necessarily committed in the commission of concealing it. In other words, Mr. Andersen
could not conceal methamphetamine without possessing it. Thus possession of the
methamphetamine was the manner by which the offense of concealment of methamphetamine
was committed.

Therefore, the information charged the same conduct in violation of the

pleadings test. It is readily apparent that both charged offenses are based upon the same factual
predicate, the possession of methamphetamine.
As such, under the pleading theory, possession of methamphetamine, as charged by the
State, is an included offense of concealment of evidence. Because the Idaho Constitution forbids
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a defendant from being punished twice for the same criminal act, Mr. Andersen’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine should be vacated as he was convicted and punished for the
offense of concealment of evidence. The convictions and punishments for both offenses violated
Mr. Andersen’s right to be free from double jeopardy. Therefore, this Court should reverse the
district court’s order denying Mr. Andersen’s motion for judgment of acquittal and vacate his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Andersen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate
his conviction for possession of a controlled substance and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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